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Abstract 
This paper proposes a forward-looking model for time-varying capital requirements 
which finds application within the New Basel Capital Accord (NBCA) framework. The 
model aims at reconciling two somewhat contrasting objectives of the NBCA proposal: 
introducing risk-sensitive capital requirements a nd avoiding at the same time 
procyclical effects. The model rests on the relationship existing between default rates 
and the business cycle phases and proposes a modelisation of the default probabilities 
which is based on a business cycle forecast over the credit horizon. The model is 
applied to US data over the forecasting period 1971-2002: despite a failure in predicting 
the early nineties recession, the objective of raising the capital requirements in 
anticipation of a recessions is in general satisfied. The results obtained are interesting as 
they s uggest that there is room for dampening procyclicality of capital requirements 
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Introduction 
In April 2003 the Basel Committee published the last proposal for the New Basel 
Capital Accord  (NBCA), which innovates over the 1988 accord (Basel Capital Accord, 
BCA) and is based on the so called  three pillars: i) Minimum c apital requirements; ii) 
Supervisory review process; iii) Market discipline. 
As for the first pillar, the main objective is to make the capital requirements more risk-
sensitive, i.e. more representative of the actual banks’ risk profiles. The increased risk-
sensitivity of capital requirements under the NBCA has raised concerns about a possible 
procyclicality side effect due to the dependence of credit risk on the business cycle. 
Procyclicality is commonly meant as the phenomenon of business cycle amplification 
due to the reduction in credit availability in recession periods (and vice versa in 
expansion periods). Procyclicality is at some degree inherent to bank activitity: if the 
capital requirement is risk-sensitive, it is likely to increase during recessions and 
decrease during expansions, hence exacerbating procyclicality.  
The present paper proposes a simple model, which can be used to tackle the 
procyclicality issue by defining the capital requirements in a forward-looking way, so 
that capital requirement changes in anticipation of the business cycle rather than as a 
consequence. The model essentially rests on the predictability view of the business 
cycle and on some stylised empirical facts emerging in the business cycle literature. The 
paper is organised as follows. Section 1 analyses the relationship between credit risk 
measurement and the business cycle so as to highlight how the procyclicality issue 
emerges within the NBCA risk measurament framework. In Section 2, the model is set 
up and its theoretical and empirical underpinnings are discussed. Section 3 applies the 
model to US data. The last Section concludes. The Appendix reports the capital 
requirement formula in the Basel Capital Accords.   2
1. Credit Risk Measurement and the Procyclicality issue in the NBCA 
Credit risk is determined both by idiosyncratic risk factors related to the single obligor 
features and by systematic risk factors affecting the creditworthiness of all the obligors. 
Systematic risk, being not diversifiable, is of uttermost importance in the assessment of 
credit risk at a portfolio level and is generally dependent on macroeconomic conditions. 
The relationship between credit risk measurement and the business cycle has given rise 
to a wide literature ( see Allen and Saunders (2003) for a survey), also fostered by the 
NBCA proposals.  
In the following subsections, we will recall the main issues that we consider to be 
relavant in setting up a model for capital requirements, which is consistent with the 
NBCA.  
1.1 The time dimension of risk 
The relationship between credit risk and the business cycle is supported both by the 
empirical evidence (e.g. Fons (1991), Wilson (1997), Nickell et al. (2000) or Bangia et 
al.  (2002), Carey (2002)) that shows the increase in default rates during recessions and 
by several theoretical models of the real business cycle, which support a negative 
correlation between credit risk factors and output (e.g. Williamson (1987), Kwark 
(2002)). The analysis of the time dimension of risk, i.e. the relationship between the 
credit risk and the business cycle, differs depending on whether risk is measured when it 
materialises or when it accumulates.  
While the existence and the nature of the relationship between the real activity and the 
default rates (as a measure of the materialised risk) is not controversial, the debate is 
still open as for the relationship between risk accumulation and the economic 
conditions. In fact, while  risk is generally considered countercyclical (i.e. higher during 
recessions and vice versa), some authors believe that risk may be highest at business   3
cycle peaks. In particular, Borio et al. (2001) maintain that the high default rates during 
recessions are just a materialisation of the risk that has been built up during booms, 
especially if a strong expansion combines with the creation of financial imbalances.  
Borio et al.  (2001) argue that these different views about the risk dynamics over the 
business cycle eventually reflect different opinions about the nature of the economic 
process underlying  the business cycle. In fact two are the main and most distant views 
of the business cycle: the “ predictability view”, i.e. the business cycle is a predictable 
regular sine wave and the “random walk view”, i.e. the business cycle is  too irregular to 
be predicted. While in the former view, macroeconomic forecast can be considered in a 
credit risk model, in the latter one the current conditions are considered the best forecast 
for the next period.  
The direct consequence of these two different views of the business cycle dynamics on 
risk measurement is the timing of the increase/decrease of the risk measure. According 
to the random walk view, the measured risk reflects the current economic conditions 
and hence it increases during recessions and decreases during expansions. By contrast, 
in the predictability view,  the risk measure should increase if a recession is going to 
happen over the credit horizon (and vice versa)  and the measured risk can increase 
during an expansion.  
1.2 Capital requirements  and the business cycle in the NBCA  
The NBCA aims at defining risk-sensitive capital requirements, i.e. capital requirements 
which vary with the riskyness of the banks’ portfolios. The risk-sensitivity of capital 
requirements implies that the latter vary with the business cycle as the actual risk 
changes. It follows that the procyclical effect of  compulsory capital requirements is 
likely to be amplified if the same are risk-sensitive.    4
The NBCA, analogously to the current regulation (BCA), imposes banks to hold the 
capital ratio (i.e. the ratio of capital over the sum of risk-weighted assets) above the 
solvency coefficient of 8% against credit risk (see the Appendix). In the BCA the 
weights are constant over time, hence only the numerator changes over the business 
cycle: in periods of recession, the capital would decrease due to default losses (because 
of increased default rates), reducing the capital ratio and consequently forcing banks to 
alternatively reduce lending (i.e. risky assets) or increase capital in order to comply with 
the capital requirement. In the NBCA, particularly in the Internal Rating Based (IRB) 
Approach, as the weights are made risk-sensitive, also the denominator is likely to 
change over time: if the risk-weighted asset increase during recessions, this effect will 
enhance the effect of the numerator implying a further reduction in the capital ratio.  
From a macroeconomic point of view, the diffused fear (see e.g. Danielsson et al. 
(2001)) is that a co-movement in capital requirement and the business cycle, may induce 
banks to further reduce lending during recessions due to the high capital requirement to 
comply with. The opposite would happen in  economic booms. This mechanism would 
eventually exacerbate the business cycle peaks and troughs. As highlighted by Leaven 
and Majnoni (2002), the risk of a ‘capital crunch’, i.e. a situation of simultaneous 
shortage of capital and contraction in the supply of new loans, can stem from the joint 
working of high capital requirements and economic slowdown. 
This  concern is particularly relevant if the ‘random walk view’ of the business cycle 
prevails: a risk sensitive capital requirement is in fact likely to fluctuate over the 
business cycle, and, especially if a ‘random walk’ view is adopted, it will be higher 
during recessions and lower during expansions. By contrast, if the “predictability view” 
is accepted, the capital requirement can be forced to increase at the peak of the business 
cycle in anticipation of a recession and to decrease at the trough in anticipation of an   5
expansion. This would smooth the business cycle sine wave turning points compared to 
the former situation. 
1.3 Credit risk variables and the business cycle 
The business cycle can enter at different levels by affecting the main variables, which 
characterise a credit risk measurement framework, i.e. :  
1. Rating; 
2. Probability of Default (PD) (and Transition Matrices (TM)); 
3. Loss Given Default, LGD; 
4. Exposure at Default, EAD; 
5. Correlations among PD, LGD and EAD; 
6. Correlations of PDs across borrowers. 
Given the focus of the model proposed in the present paper, we restrict the attention to 
the first two variables
1, which correspond to the two phases characterising a rating 
system: the  rating assignment, which classify obligors by rating classes, and the rating 
quantification, which associates a PD to each rating class. 
In order to capture the time dimension of risk, either the ratings or the corresponding 
PDs need to be modelled so as to account for economic conditions prevailing over the 
credit horizon. In line with the literature, we will refer to the PDs dependent on a 
particular state of the business cycle as ‘ conditional PDs’, as opposed to the 
‘unconditional PDs’ which are independent of the particular state of the business cycle.  
The rating assignment a nd the rating quantification overlap at a certain degree since 
models to estimate the PD of a single obligor can be used both to assign a rating and to 
contribute to the definition of the PD relative to a certain rating class. In fact, the PDs 
can be estimated in four different ways by means of: 
                                                                 
1 For a complete treatment of the link between the risk components listed above and the business cycle, 
we refer to the survey by Allen and Saunders (2003) and to the article by Lowe (2002).   6
• Statistical methods based on obligors’ specific features (mainly accounting data); 
• Structural models based on equity market data; 
• Reduced form models (typically modelling the default intensity rather than the annual 
PD) based on credit spread market data; 
• PDs implied from ratings based on historical default data. 
In the first three cases, the rating assignment and quantification can overlap, in that a 
PD estimated for the single borrower can be used both to assign the rating and to 
calculate the rating class PD as an average. 
Moreover, the rating systems can follow a ‘point in time’ (pit) logic or a ‘through the 
cycle’ (ttc) logic. The former assigns ratings according to the ability of the borrowers to 
fulfil obligations over the credit horizon and is likely to change over the business cycle; 
the latter considers this ability independently of the business cycle, i.e. considers a fixed 
scenario: the ratings assigned through the cycle are built to be stable over the business 
cycle, changing only with the idiosyncratic factors. The choice between these two 
conceptually different rating assignments depends on what type of risk the ratings are 
meant to represent, i.e. relative vs. absolute risk of borrowers. If only the  relative 
riskyness is considered in the rating assignment, ratings represent an ordinal ranking of 
borrowers, regardless of the dimension of risk. By contrast, ratings accounting for 
absolute risk consider the actual level of risk and hence also its time dimension, i.e. the 
way it varies over the business cycle. Ratings assigned  pit consider the absolute 
dimension of risk, including  the time dimension, and hence they will fluctuate over the 
business cycle. Ratings assigned  ttc instead are meant to neutralize the business cycle 
effects in order to isolate the relative riskyness of borrowers. Amato and Furfine (2003) 
argue that credit ratings “ are intended to distinguish the relatively risky firms (or 
specific bonds) from the relatively safe” and hence ratings should be assigned  ttc.   7
Crouhy et al. (2001) suggest that  ttc ratings are preferable for investment (lending) 
decisions, while  pit ratings should be used when allocating capital and defining reserves 
(hence capital requirements).
 2 
As for the NBCA,  the  banks adopting the IRB Approach are required to use a time 
horizon longer than one year in assigning ratings and to assess ratings according to the 
“borrower’s ability and willingness to contractually perform despite adverse economic 
conditions or the occurrence of unexpected events” (BCBS (2003), par 376): in such a 
way the NBCA implicitly requires a  ttc rating system. Moreover the NBCA requires 
PDs to be estimated as long-run averages, hence tendentially constant. These choices, 
which are in line with the rating agencies’ methodology, respond to the willingness of 
smoothing capital requirements over the different phases of the business cycle to avoid 
or reduce the procyclical effect, but they tend to reduce risk-sensitivity. 
 
2.The proposed Model 
2.1 Aim and set up 
From the previous section, it emerges that the main NBCA objective of introducing 
risk-sensitive capital requirements is at odds with the concern about procyclicality.  In 
fact, by essentially requiring a  ttc  logic in both risk assignment and risk quantification, 
risk-sensitivity is sacrificed in favour of a reduction in procyclicality. 
In our opinion, a way to reconcile these two somewhat contrasting needs would be to 
use a  ttc logic in the rating assingment and to account for business cycle effects w ith a 
forward-looking perspective in the rating quantification (i.e. PDs estimation). The 
forward-looking approach allows to smooth capital requirements over the business cycle 
without giving up the risk sensitivity of the very same. 
                                                                 
2 Note, in fact, the the main rating agencies (e.g. Moody’s, Standard&Poor’s) follow the ttc logic. As for 
bank practice, many banks use rating system based on balance-sheet data, which are pit  and ‘backward-  8
To this end the model  proposed in this paper takes the predictability view of the 
business cycle and aims at increasing capital requirements in anticipation of a recession 
and to lower them in anticipation of a boom. Specifically, the model suggests measuring 
capital requirements in a forward-looking way by calibrating PDs on the 
macroeconomic conditions expected to prevail over the credit horizon. 
Two are the main underpinnings of the model proposed. 
The first one, which underlies the forward-looking nature of our model, is the 
theoretical argument put forward by some authors that risk builds up before recessions 
(i.e. during expansions) and materialises during recessions. Specifically, Borio et al. 
(2001) and Segoviano and Lowe (2002) among others, stress that measured risk can be 
unduly procyclical due to a misperception of risk over the business cycle. During 
recessions the high default rates determine a high perceived risk, but according to Borio 
et al. (2001) such an increase is just a materialisation of the risk built up before the 
recession, i.e. during the economic boom. A risk measure should increase if a recession 
is going to occur over the (future) credit horizon considered, and not if the current 
economy is facing a recession at the time of the measurement. In the latter case, capital 
requirement would tend to increase when a recession has already settled, hence when 
not only it is too late to prevent losses but the increase in capital requirements can also 
exacerbate the ongoing recession. 
The increase in the capital r equirement in anticipation of a recession (e.g. point A in 
Figure 1) allows banks to adjust the level of capitalization when the economic 
conditions are still good. Analogously, the reduction in the capital requirement at the 
end of a recession (e.g. point B in Figure 1), i.e. in anticipation of an expansion, allows 
banks to expand lending and hence helps the economic recovery. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
looking’ by nature. See BCBS (2000) for a survey of the most diffused bank practice.   9








The second underpinning of our model, which underlies t he PDs modelisation,  is 
represented by the empirical evidence of regimes in the PDs over the business cycle. 
In fact, some recent literature has presented evidence of regimes existing in the PDs 
(and transition probabilities) corresponding to the business cycle regimes. Bangia et al. 
(2002) analyse the US Standard&Poor’s default and transition data and they estimate an 
expansion matrix and a recession matrix according to the NBER chronology on 
quarterly rating/default data. They find clear evidence of the  existence of two regimes, 
with the recession matrix presenting higher default and downgrading probabilities. 
Nickell et al. (2000) present similar evidence on Moody’s data, but they define three 
regimes: peaks, troughs and normal times. Both Bangia et al.  (2002) and Nickell et al. 
(2000) stress that the PDs are especially sensitive to the business cycle compared to the 
other transition probabilities: this is important since the ‘default class’ is the only one 
that is not affected by the rating agency subjectivity
3.  
                                                                 
3  In fact, even if the rating are assigned ttc, they are likely to embed some residual procyclicality (as 
shown for example by Amato and Furfine (2003)) and anyway depend on the rating agency judgement, 
while the default class is objective since it is based just on historical default data. 
A 
B   10 
Supported by this evidence, the default rates are modelled as dependent on two discrete 
states of the business cycle, namely expansion and recession.
4  
When  the PD for a given rating class is estimated as a long-run average of realised 
default r ates (as in the NBCA and in the rating agencies’ practice), the implicit 
underlying assumption is that the default rate DR is a stochastic variable with stable 
probability  distribution f(DR) and expected value E(DR)=PD.  
In the present model the one period default rate DR for each rating class is modelled as 
a stochastic variable with a probability distribution dependent on the state of the 
business cycle: the probability distribution of DR over a given period is  ) (DR f E  if the 
period is of expansion and  ) (DR f R  if the period is of recession. The modelling of the 
DR conditional on the state of the business cycle implies a different interpretation of the 
observed (realised) default rates. If a unique distribution is assumed to represent the DR 
over the business cycle, the actual default rates observed on different periods are 
interpreted as random draws from the stable distribution: high and low values of the 
default rate, which likely cluster over different general economic conditions, are just 
bad and good realisations of the same distribution. Alternatively, if two distinct 
distributions are assumed to hold over expansion and recession periods, low and high 
observed default rates can be seen as realizations of these two distributions. Figure 2 
represents the assumption considered: point A, an observed default rate, could be an 
extreme (very rare) realisation of an unconditional distribution  f(DR) or it could be a 
‘normal’ realisation of a recession distribution  ) (DR f R .  
                                                                 
4 The proprietary model CreditPortfolioView (CPV), for example, models dependence of the PDs on the 
business cycle by using macoreconomic variables as explanatory ones. This essentially implies 
dependence on an infinite number of states.    11 
 







‘R’ stands for recession distribution  ) (DR f R : ‘U’  stands for unconditional distribution f(DR) 
 
While the application of the two-regime model would be straightforward if the business 
cycle state over the time horizon considered were known, this is clearly not the case, 
and the probabilities of each state need to be considered. Bangia et al. (2002) propose to 
use constant regime switching probabilities from the Hamilton (1989) model.  
By contrast, in the present model  we propose to use time-varying  forward-looking 
regimes probabilities estimated within an econometric binary choice model. While the 
constant regime probabilities aim at representing the dynamics  of the business cycle 
state in the long-run, the time-varying probabilities account for a forecast of the state 
prevailing over the time horizon of interest. The introduction of this forward-looking 
element is central to our modelling of the default rate o ver a future horizon, since it 
allows to address the procyclicality issue. 
2.2 A formal representation  
The model is based on the following assumptions.  
A1. The model is a one-period  model and the period length is equal to the credit 
horizon. 
A2. The business cycle state S over the period is a binomial variable: 
DR  A 
R 
U   12 









S                                                                                                          (1) 
where: 
E = expansion; 
R = recession; 
P(E) = probability of an expansion over one period; 
P(R)=1-P(E) = probability of a recession over one period. 
A3. The probability of the two states P(E) and P(R) are time-varying and predictable.  
Given the current information  t I  available in t, the recession probability in period t+k is 
defined as 
  ) ' ( ) | ( ) ( t t k t k t t x f I R S P R S P b = = = = + +                                                                      (2) 
where: 
t x = explanatory variables for the business cycle regime; 
b = coefficients of the explanatory variables; 
) ' ( t x f b  = probit/logit function. 
) ( R S P k t t = +  represents the probability of a recession occurring in t+k given the 
information available in t. The expansion probability is just its complement to one.                                                                    
A4. The rating are assigned through the cycle and the default rate DR for each rating 
class is a stochastic variable with state-dependent distribution: 
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) | (                                                                               (3) 
By combining the hypotheses  A2 and  A4, the prior (hence unconditional) distribution of 
the DR over one period can be modelled as a mixture of the two conditional 
distributions: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( DR f R P DR f E P DR f R E · + · =                                                                     (4)   13 
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                                                                             (5) 
the unconditional PD can be obtained as 
R E PD R P PD E P dDR DR DRf DR E PD · + · = = = ￿ ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (                                       (6) 
It has to be noted that the definition of the unconditional PD in (6) is also consistent 
with the NBCA definition (long-run average) if the regime probabilities P(E), P(R) are 
estimated as sample proportions of realised expansions and recessions respectively
5. 
However, by considering  A3, the regime probabilities are forward-looking, i.e. clearly 
different from the sample proportions.  
The prior distribution of the default rate over the horizon  t+k given the information in  t 
is a mixture of two  distributions defined as  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( DR f R P DR f E P DR f R k t E k t t · + · = + +                                                              (7) 
where 
) | ( ) ( t k t k t I E S P E P = = + +  and  ) | ( ) ( t k t k t I R S P R P = = + + . 
While the business cycle states defines only two possible conditional distributions, the 
ex-ante distribution varies over time with the time-varying regime probabilities. 
The associated time-varying PD, estimated in t for the horizon t+k, is 
R k t E k t k t t t PD R P PD E P DR E PD · + · = = + + + ) ( ) ( ) (                                                         (8) 
                                                                 
5  If the conditional PDs in (5) are estimated as averages of expansion and recession default rates 
respectively, their combination by the sample proportion of expansions and recessions gives the long-run 
unconditional average.   14 
The PD in (8) is unconditional from a statistical point of view. Even if it depends on the 
currently available information, its classification as unconditional is consistent with the 
definition of conditional and unconditional PDs given in Gordy (2002)
6. 
If the regime probabilities are correctly forecast, the capital requirement (ceteris 
paribus) increases when a recession is going to occur over the credit horizon and vice 
versa.  
When applying the model defined by (1)-(8) to estimate the PDs as input to credit risk 
models, an issue to be solved is the time inconsistency between the credit horizon, that 
is typically one year, and a sensible period length for b usiness cycle measurement, that 
is one month or at most one quarter. Figure 3 shows a typical situation: the business 
cycle state is represented by four binary variables, one on each quarter, while the PD 
needs to be defined over a one-year horizon.  





The regime probabilities should in principle be estimated for each quarter and then 
combined to define the unconditional yearly PD. In the application presented, however, 
the choice is to estimate only the regime probability over the fourth quarter, i.e. to 
model  4 S : the reason lies in the final purpose of the model, that is to estimate PDs in a 
                                                                 
6 “An obligor’s unconditional default probability, also known as its PD or expected default frequency, is 
the probability of default before some horizon given all information currently observable. The conditional 
default probability is the PD we would assign the obligor if we also knew what the realized value of the 
systematic risk factors at the horizon would be. The unconditional PD is the average value of the 
conditional default probability across all possible realizations of the systematic risk factors. ”, Gordy 
(2002). 
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forward-looking way in order to anticipate the business cycle and hence smooth the 
procyclicality effect when estimating the capital requirements.   
 
3. Application to US data 
In this Section the model presented in Section 2 is applied to a simple artificial portfolio 
of US obligors. The application of the model consists in three phases, detailed in the 
following subsections: 
1. Identification of  the expansion and recession regimes in the default rates and 
estimation of regimes PDs ( E PD  and  R PD ) for each rating class; 
2. Business cycle forecast: estimation of the recession probability for each period 
according to equation (2) of the model; 
3. Estimation of the time-varying PDs according to equation (8) of the model and 
calculation of the capital requirements through the NBCA formula for the IRB 
approach. 
3.1 Expansion and recession PDs 
As for the estimation of  E PD  and  R PD ,  the results by Bangia et al. (2002) are 
exploited. Bangia et al. (2002) deal with full transition matrices: in the application 
presented in this paper, consistently with the NBCA requirements, only the PDs, i.e. the 
last column of the transition matrix, are considered. 
Bangia et al. (2002) use Standard & Poor’s default data
7 over the period 1981-1998 to 
compute both conditional and unconditional quarterly transition matrices. The two 
                                                                 
7 Bangia et al. (2002) use a CreditPro database containing issuer credit ratings history for 7328 companies 
from January 1981 to December 1998. While the database contain obligors from several countries, the 
88% on average of the obligors are from US.  Bangia et al. (2002) focus on US obligors when dealing 
with the business cycle.  The model proposed in this paper applies to banks dealing with obligors 
belonging to the same country or to countries obeying to the same business cycle (e.g. possibly European 
Union). If foreign obligors are considered, clearly different business cycles chronology and forecasting 
need to be considered. 
   16 
conditional matrices, shown in Tables 1.a and 1.b, are estimated as averages over 
expansion and recession sub-periods according to  the NBER classification
8. 
Table 1a US Expansion quarterly transition matrix 
  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  CCC  D 
AAA  0.9821  0.0166  0.0011  0.0002  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
AA  0.0015  0.9808  0.0161  0.0012  0.0001  0.0003  0.0001  0.0000 
A  0.0002  0.0053  0.9806  0.0121  0.0011  0.0006  0.0000  0.0000 
BBB  0.0001  0.0007  0.0147  0.9694  0.0125  0.0022  0.0002  0.0002 
BB  0.0001  0.0003  0.0019  0.0193  0.9531  0.0225  0.0016  0.0012 
B  0.0000  0.0002  0.0007  0.0010  0.0170  0.9591  0.0131  0.0088 
CCC  0.0005  0.0000  0.0019  0.0023  0.0047  0.0357  0.8732  0.0817 
D  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
Source: Bangia et al (2002) 
Table 1b US Recession quarterly transition matrix 
  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  CCC  D 
AAA  0.9799  0.0176  0.0025  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
AA  0.0018  0.9689  0.0279  0.0005  0.0009  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
A  0.0002  0.0088  0.9644  0.0259  0.0007  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
BBB  0.0004  0.0004  0.0111  0.9631  0.0233  0.0007  0.0000  0.0011 
BB  0.0000  0.0006  0.0006  0.0139  0.9498  0.0272  0.0042  0.0036 
B  0.0000  0.0006  0.0006  0.0011  0.0072  0.9502  0.0272  0.0177 
CCC  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0120  0.8560  0.1320 
D  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
Source: Bangia et al (2002) 
Bangia et al. (2002) prove that the elements in the grey cells are significantly different 
at the 5% level from the unconditional matrix. Moreover the volatility of each element 
is strongly reduced in the two conditional matrices compared to the unconditional one. 
This evidence i s stronger for the recession matrix, indicating that transition probabilities 
                                                                 
8 The NBER classification is monthly. Bangia et al. (2002) label each quarter as expansion or recession 
according to the NBER definitions.    17 
are more stable during recessions. The default probabilities display most clearly the 
existence of the two regimes: they increase strongly during recessions and their 
coefficients of variation decrease more than the other elements of the transition matrix 
(by at least 40%). 
According to the NBCA, the reference credit horizon is one year: hence we have 
converted the quarterly  matrices into annual ones.  Assuming that the credit 
migration/default process is a time-homogeneous Markov chain, the annual matrix can 
be obtained by taking the fourth power of the quarterly matrix
9.  
3.2 Recession forecast 
In order to have a recession forecast, equation (2) of the model has to be estimated. In 
the present application we do that within a probit model
10, i.e.    
( ) t k t t t k t x R P I R S P ' ) 1 ( ) | ( b F = = = = + +                                                                          (9) 
where: 
t x = explanatory variables, including the constant; 
b= coefficients on the explanatory variables; 
F= cumulative normal distribution function; 










                                                                 
9 The transition matrices estimated by rating agencies as historical averages rely on a time-homogeneous 
Markov chain assumption: such a property allows to collect data over different years to obtain estimators 
for the transition probabilities. Under the time-homogeneity hypothesis transition probabilities over 
multiple horizons can be derived as  ( ) ) , 1 ( )... 2 , 1 ( ) 1 , 0 ( ) 1 , 0 ( ) , 0 ( T T P P P with P T P
T - = = = . While 
in estimating the unconditional matrix the migration process is assumed to be a time-homogeneous 
Markov chain over the entire sample, the hypothesis restricts to the two recession/expansion sub-sample 
when estimating the conditional matrices.                                               
10 In line with most of the literature on recession probability forecast, a probit model is chosen. Moreover, 
a logit model (as used e.g. in Artis et al. (2002)) has been estimated on the same data set and the results 
are very similar.   18 
 We set k equal to four quarters to obtain a four quarters ahead forecast. We take the 
realized value of  t R  to be defined by the NBER quarterly classification. The NBER 
turning points on the period of interest (1951-2002) are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 NBER classification
11 
Peaks  Troughs 
Jul-53  May-54 
Aug-57  Apr-58 
Apr-60  Feb-61 
Dec-69  Nov-70 
Nov-73  Mar-75 
Jan-80  Jul-80 
Jul-81  Nov-82 
Jul-90  Mar-91 
Mar-01  Nov-01 
 
As for the explanatory variables, in the present paper we consider the term spread 
between the ten years treasury bond and the three months treasury bill rate and  the 
Standard&Poor’s equity price index.  
Many economic and financial variables have been tested in the literature on business 
cycle forecasting. Financial variables are appealing for forecasting purposes since they 
contain predictive information and are immediately available, while macroeconomic 
variables are generally available with some delay. Specifically, there is a consensus on 
the usefulness of the interest rate term spreads and equity prices in predicting the 
                                                                 
11 The conversion from the monthly chronology to the quarterly one is preformed according to the 
following criterion: 
•if the turning point occurs in the first month of the quarter ﬁ the quarter is classified according to the 
regime prevailing at the end of the quarter; 
•if the turning point occurs in the third month of the quarter ﬁ the quarter is classified according to the 
regime prevailing at the beginning of the quarter;   19 
business cycle
12. The forecasting power of stock prices is related to their interpretation 
as expected present values of future dividend streams. Moreover, it could be argued that 
agents in financial markets have access to additional private information, which 
provides them with a forecasting power eventually embedded in equity prices. The 
spread is related to a forward interest rate and can be decomposed into a real and an 
inflation component. While the expected real rate embeds expectations on monetary 
policy, the expected inflation component is related to future real growth, since inflation 
tends to be positively related to real activity
13. 
The choice of these two financial variables is supported by empirical evidence. In 
particular, Estrella and Mishkin (1998), analyse the US business cycle from 1959 to 
1995 by means of a probit model considering many macroeconomic and financial 
variables and find that the term spread is the best predictor at least from two quarters 
ahead onwards.  Moreover the equity index price gives good results when combined 
with the term spread, particularly for horizons longer than two quarters
14. 
The series for the explanatory variables considered in this paper have been downloaded 
from  DataStream. The estimation over the full sample (1951-2002) gives  coefficients 
which reflect the expected theoretical relation: a negative relationship between the 
recession probability and the equity index, suggests a positive relation between the latter 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
•if the turning point occurs in the second month (i.e. in the middle) of the quarter ﬁ the quarter is 
classified according to the regime prevailing at the beginning of the quarter. 
12 There is a wide econometric literature on business cycle forecasting based on financial variables, in 
particular on the interest rate term spread, as predictors. While most of it use linear regression-based 
techniques to forecast the output growth rate, some authors (e.g. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Estrella 
and Mishkin (1997), (1998)) estimate instead the likelihood of future recessions by means of binary 
choice models.  
13 Rendu de Lint ad Stolin (2003) present a theorethical model to explain the predictive power of the term 
spread for output. Estrella et al. (2000) briefly present several possible explanations for the positive 
empirical relationship between the slope of the yield curve and real activity. 
14 In the in-sample analysis Estrella and Mishkin (1998) find that there are several variables with good 
explanatory power, that are the ten years bond – three months bill spread, the stock index (NYSE or 
S&P500), the real monetary base and the Stock-Watson leading index. While the spread outperforms all 
the other variables at least from the third quarter ahead, both the two real variables perform better than the 
stock index over most of the horizons. However, if the two economic variables are combined with the   20 
and real activity. Analogously, the negative relationship between the recession 
probability and the term spread, suggests a positive correlation between the latter and 
real activity. However, an analysis based on the McFadden 
2 R  and on the Schwartz 
Information Criterion suggests to drop the S&P from the regression
15. Hence we used 
the spread as the unique predictor.  
The period 1951-1970 is considered as the initial estimation period, while 1971-2002 is 
the forecasting period. Over the forecasting sample the parameters are estimated by 
updating the sample year by year
16. 
Figure 4 shows the out-of-sample quarterly forecast recession probability as a series 
from 1971 to 2002. 








The black line is the recession probability predicted four quarters ahead. The grey bars represent the 
actual recessions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
spread, they lose their significance beyond the first quarter. On the other hand, the equity index  remains 
significant on several horizons. This result is confirmed in the out-of-sample analysis.  
15 The results of the estimation are available upon request. 
16 Ideally the estimation window should be updated every quarter, while in this work it is updated only 
yearly. The reason is that, since the credit horizon requires a one-year horizon, the parameters are updated 
following the credit horizon. A 19 years rolling estimation  window is used in this work. Estrella and 
Mishkin (1998) use instead an incremental window. Chauvet and Potter (2002) individuate a structural 
break in the first half of the eighties. The use of a rolling window makes the problem of  structural breaks 
less stringent: for example, Chauvet and Potter (2002) stress how the recession probability over the 2001 
recession changes when accounting or not for the structural break: in our case, the length of the moving 
window is such that the parameters estimated for the 2001 recession forecast are almost entirely based on 
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The recession probability profile is very similar to the one obtained in Estrella and 
Mishkin (1998) for the common period of estimation, i.e. 1971-1995. Figure 4 shows 
that the recession probability forecast is high over recession periods, as it is desirable
17. 
However, it has to be noted that the 1990/91 recession forecast is very weak: Estrella 
and Mishkin (1998), who find a similar result, justify it by saying that this recession was 
widely unpredictable since it was strictly related to the invasion of Kuwait. Over the 
period not covered in Estrella and Mishkin (1998), the recession probability correctly 
increases with the 2001 recession. There are some irregular increases in the recession 
probability around 1996-97 and 1999: they may be linked to specific episodes, namely 
the Asiatic crisis and Russian debt crisis.  
3.3 Time-varying PDs and capital requirements 
Based on the estimation results of the previous sections, the time-varying PDs are 
calculated for each rating class as in equation (8). A simplified portfolio with a constant 
exposure on each rating class from BBB to CCC is considered
18: the exposures are 
defined approximately according to the average ratings distribution of the S&P 
database
19.  
The capital requirement are calculated by applying the NBCA formula for the IRB 
approach (BCBS (2003), par. 239-241). The time-varying capital requirement is 
calculated by using the model PDs as input
20; this can be compared to the constant 
                                                                 
17 Beyond the visual evidence, a formal measure of the goodness of fit can be computed by comparing the 
predictions from the estimated model with the predictions obtained by using the constant as the unique 
regressor (coefficients of the explanatory variables constrained to zero). The goodness-of-fit measure, 
henceforth gof, on the prediction sample is  263 . 0 = gof , which is largely positive, even if far from one, 
meaning that the forecasting model is preferable to the simple sample proportion criterion. 
18 Since the PDs for ratings above A are generally very close to zero and since the NBCA imposes a 
minimum PD of 0.0003 for every rating, here only rating classes from BBB downward are considered.  
19 From the database used in Bangia et al. (2002), the relative percentage of the ratings BBB, BB, B, CCC 
is approximately derived: the resulting portfolio has exposures of 156, 118, 118 and 8 respectively on the 
four ratings over a total exposure of 400. Actually the composition of the portfolio is not very relevant in 
this context: however, this rough approximation aims at representing a realistic portfolio. 
20 The LGD is fixed at 50% and the maturity M at 2.5. As in the current NBCA the PDs tend to be 
constant over time, the correlation formula just discriminate among different rating classes. In order to 
fulfil this purpose and not to mix the results of the time-varying PDs with a time-varying correlation, the   22 
capital requirement obtained with the constant (long-run averages) PDs as input. Figure 
5 compares the time-varying (quarterly revised) capital requirement and the constant 
standard one and displays the capital requirements conditional on  expansion and 
recession (i.e. calculated with expansion and recession PDs), which define a lower and 
upper bound respectively. 








Clearly the time-varying capital requirement increases when the probability of a 
recession over the next year increases. In particular, since the constant PDs are 
estimated as averages over the period 1981-1998, the time-varying capital requirement 
is higher than the constant one when the forecast recession probability is higher than the 
sample proportion of recession (12.5%). In general the time-varying capital requirement 
behaves well in anticipating the business cycle. However, Figure 5 shows that in the 
case of the 1990-91 recession, the capital requirement changes only slightly, as the 
recession was just slightly signalled by the probability forecast (Figure 4), due to the 
specific features of this recession. Even if the regime prediction model did not produce 
a strong forecast, the time-varying estimates of the PDs produce anyway a higher capital 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
correlations are calculated in the same way as the standard NBCA formula, i.e. as a function of constant 








































































































actual recessions time-varying CR constant CR
recession CR expansion CR  23 
requirement than the one obtained from the standard constant PDs in the period before 
the recession.  
These results contribute to the debate on procyclicality. Clearly the capital requirement 
calculated by means of the model proposed changes with the business cycle, leaving 
space to procyclical effects. However, since the increases/decreases in capital 
requirement generally anticipate the business cycle, peaks and troughs can be smoothed.  
 
Conclusions 
The NBCA, in innovating on the current regulation, aims at making the capital 
requirement more risk-sensitive, i.e. more representative of the actual risk faced by 
banks. As for credit risk, given the link between the latter and the business cycle, it may 
well be that risk-sensitive capital requirements produce procyclical effects, which in 
turn are  likely to exacerbate recessions. In order to avoid these by-effects, the NBCA 
requires banks adopting the IRB approach to follow a ‘through the cycle’ logic in 
assigning and quantifying ratings so as to neutralise the business cycle effects. Since the 
business cycle affects the systematic component of risk, by neutralizing it an important 
risk factor is neglected.  
In sum, two important objectives inherent in the NBCA, the risk-sensitivity of capital 
requirements on one side and the reduction of procyclicality on the other, appear 
somehow contrasting.  
The aim of this paper is to propose a model, which, by considering the business cycle 
effects in a forward-looking perspective, partly reconciles the two a bove mentioned 
objectives. The model proposed defines forward-looking capital requirements by 
modelling the PDs as time-varying according to a busienss cycle  forecast. The default 
rate is defined as a stochastic variable, whose probability distribution is a mixture of an   24 
expansion and a recession distribution. In line with a vast literature on business cycle 
forecasting, the expansion and recession probabilities are estimated using financial 
variables as predictors.  
The model is applied to quarterly US data over the forecasting period 1971-2002, 
whereby the NBER chronology is adopted to date the business cycle phases. The 
expansion and recession PDs, based on a Standard&Poor’s database, are combined with  
business cycle states probabilities estimated within a probit model with the interest rate 
term spread as the only predictor. The capital requirement is then calculated according 
to the NBCA formula. Since the objective of the model is that of producing a capital 
requirement which varies in anticipation of the business cycle,  its  performance is 
clearly related to the predictive ability of  the business cycle forecasting model adopted. 
Despite the nineties recession is only slightly signalled by the recession probability 
forecast, the results over the whole period are encouraging since the capital requirement 
generally increases/decreases in anticipation of the recessions/expansions, with a 
possible smoothing effect on the business cycle turning points.  
The validity of the model proposed can be further evaluated both from a micro- and a 
macro-economic point of view.  At a micro level, the effects of the capital requirement 
on an individual bank performance can be assessed. Specifically, the effects of the time-
varying capital requirement vs. the constant one can be gauged with respect to the bank 
portfolio composition. This analysis could allow to evaluate the ability of the model to 
limit default losses. At a macro level, the issue is to evaluate the effects of the proposed 
forward-looking capital requirements on the economy as a whole. The macroeconomic 
consequences are quite difficult to assess, since they depend on the relationship between 
output and lending. These two issues, which require a separate study, are left for future 
research.   25 
Appendix: Capital requirement in the Basel Accords 
The capital requirement in both the BCA and the NBCA is defined by a minimum level 





RC                                                                                                             (A.1) 
RC = regulatory capital; 
i A  = risky activities; 
i W  =risk weights. 
The denominator in (A.1) is the sum of the risk-weighted assets, which is made more 
risk-sensitive in the NBCA, in particular within the IRB approach. With reference to 
corporate exposures, the computation of the risk weight for each activity is defined as 
follows: 
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LGD = Loss Given Default; 
PD = Probability of Default; 
M = Maturity; 
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